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Blackmarketing 
“Bundeswehr” Weapons in 
Northern Iraq:
Applying a Due Diligence Approach to Arms 
Transfers?
In September 2014, the German army started shipping 
weapons from its own stocks to the security forces of the 
Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq (Peshmerga) to 
support the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh). Strong reservations 
arguing that these weapons might end up in the wrong hands 
and likely be used to commit human rights violations were 
voiced, especially considering that ISIL has acquired most of 
its military equipment by capturing it from existing 

stockpiles and black markets in Iraq and Syria (SIPRI 
Yearbook 2015, Part I, 2.III., p. 49). To a large extent, 
therefore, it may not come as a surprise that weapons 
engraved with the letters “bw”, which stands for 
“Bundeswehr”, were discovered on offer in black markets in 
the mountains of Northern Iraq. In response to these 
developments, the German Federal Ministry of Defence 
explicitly shirked responsibility by holding the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) responsible for the whereabouts 
of the arms, and declared that the weapons transferred by 
Germany have been used in accordance with international 
law (see e.g. here).
Traditionally, the legality of arms transfers – understood as 
non-commercial transfers of conventional weapons initiated 
by States in the form of military aid to foreign governments 
or non-state actors – has been treated as a question 
governed exclusively by arms control law. More recently, 
however, international human rights law has increasingly 
been attracting attention as a source of restrictions of arms 
transfers. Nevertheless, the argument for the normative 
relevance of human rights for arms transfers is obviously a 
difficult one to make, especially as it concerns its 
applicability beyond the transferring State’s borders. This 
blog post argues that the due diligence obligation to prevent
human rights violations has the potential to fill this lacuna 
when seeking to protect human rights in the context of arms 
transfers.
The bindingness of international human rights treaties 
with respect to arms transfers
Under the law of state responsibility, the supply of weapons 
might indeed trigger responsibility for “extraterritorial 
complicity” – in this regard the above-mentioned statement 
by the German Federal Ministry of Defence cannot be 
considered proper legal reasoning. Then, the transferring 
State may have committed an internationally wrongful act
through the provided weapons (“aid or assistance”) that are 
used to commit human rights violations (see article 16 of the 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility), even if the transfer 
is lawful according to national regulations (see Bellal, Arms 
Transfers and International Human Rights Law, in Casey-
Maslen (ed.), Weapons under International Human Rights 
Law, p. 451).
Against this backdrop, the key question to be answered is 
whether international human rights treaties put supplier 
States under any obligations with regard to arms transfers to 
foreign governments or non-state actors that end up with 
intended or non-intended end-users who misuse them or are 
likely to do so. Accordingly, in cases where the transferring 
State might be found responsible for human rights violations, 
a two-level analysis is necessary to assess:
(1) the bindingness of international human rights obligations 
of the transferring State in the national decision-making 
process on arms transfers (“transfer authorization”) at the 
domestic level, and
(2) the extraterritorial bindingness of human rights 
obligations by the transferring State outside of its own 
territory after the weapons have been delivered to the 
recipient’s destination.
Let me start with the latter, the more typical example that 
touches upon the traditional concept of extraterritoriality: 
This instance assesses whether transferring States have 
extraterritorial obligations stemming from international 
human rights treaties towards individuals located outside the 
transferring State’s territory.
In this regard, the obstacle to establishing state responsibility 
lies in demonstrating the causal link between the transfers 
that have been made by the transferring State and violations 
of international human rights law which, in the vast majority 
of cases, were committed by private parties. Exemplified by 
our case, there is also a factual question that seems to be 
relatively straightforward: How can we trace what happened 
to the Bundeswehr weapons sold in Iraq’s black markets, and 
how can we identify the responsible actors committing the 
acts in question that were facilitated by these delivered 
weapons, as well as the victims? Consequently, with respect 
to attribution, the conduct by non-state actors will 
principally not be attributable to the transferring State 
outside its own borders due to lack of control (see article 8 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility).
A favoured solution for arms transfers…
However, the claim that is made here is that the due diligence 
obligation to prevent human rights violations should play a 
pivotal role in the regulation of arms transfers, namely in the 
national authorization processes. Having its roots in the no-
harm rule under international environmental law, it remains 
unclear whether there is an emerging common standard of 
due diligence that can be applied across various fields of 
international law (see first report of the ILA Study Group on 
Due Diligence in International Law of 7 March 2014). In the 
area of human rights, the clearest manifestation of such an 
obligation is found in the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) which stated: “an 
illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially 
not directly imputable to a State (…) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but 
because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation (…)” 
(IACtHR, Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 
1988, para. 172).
Nevertheless, does Germany’s due diligence obligation to 
prevent human rights violations extend beyond its own 
borders? The potential harm will likely ultimately occur 
outside of the territory of that State. Arguably, the due 
diligence obligation is understood in a manner that it is a 
“territorial” obligation, rather than an “extraterritorial” one. 
The due diligence obligation is “relocated” to an earlier point 
for binding Germany to take preventive measures at the 
source, where it (still) exercises control over the weapons 
that are supposed to be delivered. Hence, this makes such an 
obligation quite an attractive approach regarding arms 
transfers, because it avoids the problem of attribution, as 
mentioned above. Notably, there are interesting analogies 
that support the point that actions subject to due diligence 
obligation lie “at home” and not “abroad”: for example 
preventing the cross-border movement of terrorists (see 
S/RES/2178 (2014) of 24 September 2014), or the duty of 
“non-refoulement” under refugee law.
What exactly is covered by the due diligence obligation to 
prevent human rights violations? Apart from the requirement 
of the existence of a substantial risk that violations of human 
rights might occur, the threshold of the due diligence 
obligation consists of a variable standard oriented towards 
the capacity to act on behalf of the transferring State. This 
includes a reasonableness test by that State in view of the 
appropriate measures that have to be taken in order to 
prevent that risk (see also ICJ, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro, Judgement of February 26, 2007, 
para. 430).
The “procedural” dimension of the due diligence obligation
How can such an obligation be operationalized in the context 
of arms transfers? The procedural duty to take effective 
preventive measures entails risk assessments, similar to 
environmental impact assessments, which have to be 
conducted in the national authorization processes. The EU 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 
2008 specifies the content of such assessments in providing 
a range of legal and political parameters that have to be taken 
into account. These are, among others, the internal situation 
of the recipient country, human rights, the risk of diversion, 
and the preservation of regional peace, security and stability. 
An end-user certificate (“Endverbleibserklärung”), as obtained 
by Germany from the KRG, as well as the training mission for 
the Peshmerga by German soldiers, might be a “right” step in 
this direction. Nevertheless, as we have seen, their 
functionality is limited. Where serious human rights 
violations by all parties involved in the conflict have widely 
occurred, such as in Iraq, (this was quite predictable in 
Germany’s case, see e.g. here), an appropriate measure would 
be the denial of such transfers (although I accept that the 
threat posed by ISIL is quite a strong counterargument). Yet, 
States should not by way of arms transfers delegate military 
action to uncontrollable third parties, as they could arguably 
have to take other measures of foreign policy towards 
international peace and security.
In conclusion, the due diligence obligation for the field of 
arms transfers proposed here allows one to internalize 
international human rights norms into the national decision-
making process and to harmonize the assessment of such 
authorizations – there are already other cases in progress 
(see e.g. here).
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